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Abstract 
Reception and implementation of public sector reform ideas varies across countries. Westminster-
type systems (Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada) adopted New Public Management ideas 
most enthusiastically. Ireland was slower to do so. Continental European countries were the least 
enthusiastic. This gives us some insight into the political and organizational conditions that underpin 
adoption of NPM, and of post-NPM, which now coincides with international economic difficulties. 
The Irish experience provides a useful prism for analysing the issues involved in seeking to alter the 
‘public  service  bargain’  under  conditions  of  economic  crisis.  Membership  of  the  Euro  provides 
protection against currency collapse, but also entails severe cost adjustment measures without the 
cushion  of  devaluation.  The  reassertion  of  central  management  of  budget  allocations  involves 
making stark choices between the numbers employed, the volume of services delivered, and the rate 
of remuneration of employees. The options facing government depend not only on the scale of fiscal 
problems, but also on the manner in which the crisis is politically managed and the legitimating 
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1. Introduction  
The challenge of how best to achieve public sector efficiency is a recurring theme in the political 
discourse of democratic societies, and all the more so when the public finances are under pressure 
and budgetary restraint assumes a higher priority. Ireland is currently experiencing a more severe 
economic downturn than many of the advanced industrial societies in response to the global financial 
crisis.  This  has  implications  for  its  public  sector  reform  ambitions,  since  achieving  increased 
efficiencies  and  greater  effectiveness  is  particularly  difficult  in  an  environment  of  severe  fiscal 
restraint. 
Section 2 of this paper outlines the political economy context that has made the role of the state 
problematic in contemporary political economies, throwing up new challenges of effectiveness and 
efficiency for public sector organization. Section 3 outlines variations in the extent to which public 
sector  reform  ideas  have  taken  hold,  and  situates  Ireland’s  experiences  comparatively.  The  next 
section outlines the particular forms that public sector reform has taken in Ireland, and shows that 
this  was  more  symbolic  than  substantive.  The  fifth  section  looks  in  more  detail  at  the  current 
challenges facing the new phase of public sector reform during  an economic downturn. A brief 
conclusion summarizes the argument. 
2. The political economy context of public sector reform 
Public sector reform has been on the agenda of the advanced industrial societies since the 1970s, 
which was a watershed period in global political economy. Countries’ initial responses to the 1970s 
oil-price  crisis  were  varied,  with  different  priorities  accorded  to  state  interventions  to  sustain 
employment levels (Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh 1992; Scharpf 1991). But as inflationary trends 
proved  difficult  to  contain,  and  states  incurred  ever-greater  fiscal  deficits  in  response  to  higher 
welfare needs as well as industrial supports, the sustainability of the dominant post-war Keynesian 
paradigm came increasingly into question. During the 1980s, monetarist ideas gained the status of a 
new economic orthodoxy, aided in part by the OECD. This had implications for domestic economic 
management priorities, arguing for a strengthening of the play of market forces and a reduction of an 
activist state role. This led to a shift in priorities across many  areas of policy: a preference for 
privatization over nationalization of productive assets and utilities, prioritization of inflation control 
through monetary rather than fiscal means, reduction of fiscal deficits through spending cuts rather 
than tax increases, and a redesign of tax instruments in favour of neutrality rather than progressivity. 3 | P a g e  
 
The  market-conforming  policy  shift  also  had  implications  for  global  political  economy:  market 
forces  were  to  be  given  freer  rein  not  only  within  national  economies  but  also  trans-nationally, 
resulting in a tilt toward relaxation of controls over capital mobility, and renewed commitment to 
trade liberalization – the start of the modern phase of globalization (Deeg and O'Sullivan 2009; 
Eichengreen 2006; Gilpin 2001).  
Yet  even  as  the  global  context  of  macroeconomic  management  changed  inexorably,  national 
variations persisted in the combinations of economic policies they adopted, and in the profile of 
economic performance they displayed as a consequence. All countries have to adjust to the reality of 
international capital mobility and the immense power and speed of money markets. The degree to 
which  this  constrains  government  options  on  taxation  and  spending  is  a  subject  of  much  active 
debate. The constraints are real, and the parameters within which governments can choose effective 
policy combinations has shifted (Busemeyer 2009). Yet it is by now well established that the forces 
of globalization do not have uniform effects on national political economies.  
Three broad clusters of types of political economy are commonly identified. The ‘liberal market 
economies’  (LME),  comprising  the  USA  and  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  Britain,  and 
Ireland, feature production systems that are organized to be adaptable to short-term shifts in market 
signals.  The    ‘coordinated’  or  ‘social  market  economies’  (CME  or  SME),  including  Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, and the Nordic countries, tend to be less 
flexibly responsive in the short term, but to have powerful capacities for long-term performance 
maximization. A third cluster of countries, the ‘mixed market economies’ (MME), including France, 
Italy, and Japan, permit a significantly greater direct role for the state in managing and even owning 
productive facilities (Hall 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Molina and Rhodes 2007).  
Contrary to neo-liberal ideology though, it has become clear that there is no single best recipe for 
generating  successful  economic  performance.  There  is  no  ineluctable  ‘race  to  the  bottom’  to 
dismantle social protection (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 2004; Sapir 2006). Business interests no 
not have a single simple set of preferences about the optimal economic environment in which to 
invest,  although  they  are  less  forgiving  about  the  debt  implications  of  high  spending  levels  in 
developing countries than in developed economies (Mosley 2003; 2005). Country profiles continue 
to vary significantly: notwithstanding recent blurring around the edges, production systems continue 
to be organized in systematically different ways, giving rise to different patterns in the preferences of 
both business and employees for welfare protection (Hall 2007). Globalization is a real economic 4 | P a g e  
 
fact,  but  as  Dani  Rodrik  has  argued,  among  others,  there  are  ‘many  recipes’  (Rodrik  2007)  for 
adjusting to its realities. As Figure 1 below illustrates, the LMEs did not systematically out-perform 
the social market economies between the 1980s and 2000s: growth performance varies depending on 
the period one looks at. As might be expected, the liberal market economies tend to both lose and 
create  jobs  more  quickly;  and  social  market  economies,  while  more  intensively  involved  in 
exporting, did rather better overall on measures of income equality. 
Figure 1. Selected indicators of economic performance by variety of capitalism 
While scholars debate the terms in which systematic patterns of economic organization and welfare 
provision should best be analysed, there is no disagreement that there is a great deal of variation in, 
for  example,  the  way  state  and  market  relate  to  one  another,  the  way  firms  organize,  the  legal 
framework  governing  shareholder  interests,  the  regulatory  environment,  and  the  extent  and 
penetration of welfare supports into the labour market and the household (Crouch, Streeck, Boyer, 
Amable, Hall and Jackson 2005; Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck and Myles 2002).  
These variations in the systematic ways in which states structure and regulate markets are reflected 
in other ways of classifying the rich democratic countries. For example, the distinction between 
liberal market economies and the rest mirrors the distinction between common-law countries and 
administrative  law  countries  (which  may  in  turn  be  sub-divided  into,  for  example,  Napoleonic, 
Germanic, and Nordic variants). The organizational apparatus of the state functions very differently 
in each case. The state is not a uniform structure with uniform features. As Peter Evans notes, ‘states 
are not generic. They vary dramatically in their internal structures and relations to society. Different 
kinds  of  state  structures  create  different  capacities  for  state  action’  (Evans  1995,  p.11).  The 
institutionalized ways in which state structures are embedded in the economy, and the nature of the 
linkages  that  states  have  with  organized  interests,  give  them  very  different  opportunities  for 
consulting, for processing societal demands and preferences, for implementing policy. Patterns of 
governance are sometimes characterized as based on a combination of hierarchical decision-making, 
facilitation of market signals, and consultation with networks of organized interests (Kjaer 2004; 
Kooiman  2003).  But  government  is  not  analytically  distinct  from  governance.  The  ‘shadow  of 
hierarchy’ is the precondition and the guarantor of all modes of governance (Goetz 2008; Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl 2008; Scharpf 1997). A moment’s reflection reveals that each of these modes of 
governance in fact depends on the support available to democratically elected politicians from the 
public bureaucracy. 5 | P a g e  
 
Public  service  employment  may  feature  systematic  differences  in  patterns  of  recruitment,  career 
mobility,  and  connections  with  democratically  elected  and  accountable  political  representatives 
(Newton and van Deth 2005, pp.120-121).  
For  example,  permanent  appointment  to  the  public  administration  is  typical  in  many  countries 
including Britain, France, and Germany. But political appointment on a temporary basis of the top 
cadre of administrators is the norm in the USA, where about 3,000 people are appointed to top 
Washington  positions  with  each  change  of  administration.  France  and  Germany  also  feature  a 
stratum of appointments that are made on political grounds to support incoming ministers, whose 
term  of  appointment  lapses  with  that  government.  Yet  the  practice  of  having  an  intermediate 
‘cabinet’ on the public payroll, but outside the terms of standard career employment in the public 
bureaucracy and outside normal ministry structures, is becoming more common.  
Similarly, civil servants in some systems are expected to be generalists, able to turn their abilities to 
any task: this is the case in Britain and Ireland, also in Italy, Spain and Portugal. But prior attainment 
and updating of technocratic skills, especially legal skills, are prioritized in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the Nordic countries. Recruitment is drawn from elite structures in many countries, 
most  strikingly  in  France  and  Japan,  but  is  more  open  elsewhere.  Even  if  political  neutrality  is 
assumed,  Knill  distinguishes  between  ‘instrumental’  bureaucracies  on  the  Whitehall  model  that 
service the government of the day, with ‘autonomous’ bureaucracies characteristic of continental 
European  legal  traditions  in  which  the  civil  service  is  expected  to  aggregate  and  protect  public 
interest considerations (Knill 1999). Yet in many countries, the tension between bureaucracy and 
democratically  elected  representation  is  growing.  It  seems  that  career  civil  servants  experience 
difficulty  striking  a  balance  between  independence,  subordination  to  political  leadership,  and 
personal career development.  
And finally, the problems of managing politicization of the senior bureaucracy take a different form 
again  in  post-communist  countries  that  have  not  had  strong  traditions  of  impartiality  in  state 
administration, nor have they had and ethos of either instrumental or autonomous policy-making in 
the public service (Goetz 2001; Goetz and Margetts 1999). 
As Hood and Lodge point out, the dimensions of variation are more complex than conventional 
distinctions  typically  capture.  The  ‘public  sector  bargain’  may  be  struck  very  differently  across 
countries, when we consider the range of issues that are in contention such as prior training required 
for appointment to and promotion within the senior civil service, the terms of remuneration, the 6 | P a g e  
 
degree of political partisanship permitted or expected, and the responsibilities associated with these 
positions.  And  it  is  a  ‘bargain’  that  is  not  struck  unilaterally  by  one  side  or  the  other,  but  that 
emerges through complex historical trajectories of negotiation and compromise between politicians 
and senior bureaucrats (Hood and Lodge 2006, 3-22). Although they distinguish between what they 
call  reward,  competency,  and  loyalty  bargains,  Hood  and  Lodge  note  that  individual  countries 
increasingly  have  a  mix  of  types  of  public  service  bargain  across  different  areas  of  the  public 
administration – top and medium levels of the core bureaucracy, regulators, Central Bank, and so on 
(Hood  and  Lodge  2006  139-149),  which  makes  it  more  difficult  to  generalize  about  a  single 
dominant approach in any one country. 
The most basic aspect of state capacity is the scale of employment in the public sector – and there is 
still considerable variation in the size of the state measured in this way, as Figures 2a and 2b below 
show. 
Figure 2a. Employment in general government as a percentage of the labour force (1995 and 2005)  
Figure 2b. Employment in general government and public corporations as a percentage of the labour 
force (1995 and 2005) 
In 2005, Norway and Sweden had the largest proportion of employment in general government, with 
traditionally ‘small states’ such as Switzerland and Japan toward the other end of the scale. But these 
figures do not tell the whole story about the size of the public sector in general, as many aspects of 
welfare services, for example, are organized through local government. Even confining our attention 
to  national-level  employment,  adding  in  employment  in  state  corporations  changes  the  picture 
somewhat, and brings the size of state employment in France up considerably, along with the Czech 
and Slovak republics with their large communist-era state legacies. 
All of this means that bureaucratic structures and public sector employment more generally have to 
be understood as part of the overall governance system of a society. Bureaucratic organization itself 
is not merely an instrument, but is an institutional structure that is embedded in a network of legal, 
organizational and normative practices that vary cross-nationally. It implies, drawing on Weber’s 
classic definition,   
a larger organizational and normative structure where government is founded on authority, that is, 
the belief in a legitimate, rational-legal political order and the right of the state to define and 
enforce  the  legal  order....  between  citizens  and  elected  representatives,  between  democratic 7 | P a g e  
 
legislation and administration, within administration, and between administration and citizens as 
subjects (as well as authors) of law (Olsen 2005, pp.2-3). 
3. The differential reception of New Public Management reforms 
New Public Management (NPM) has often been seen as the counterpart in public sector reform to 
neo-liberal economic thought. Concerns with reducing the size of government and expanding the 
scope of market disciplines had implications for many aspects of public sector organization. NPM 
has no consistent doctrinal core and there is no consensus on a definitive checklist of indicators about 
what matters most. However, public sector activities had developed many commonalities during the 
20
th century, which now came increasingly into question.  
Profiles of NPM 
Two aspects of the public sector might initially be distinguished: the extent of direct ownership of 
public assets, and the degree to which private sector management principles might be brought to bear 
on the organization and activities of the public sector.  
Privatization is defined as any shift in the dilution of state ownership of resources, including the 
commercial disposition of a portion of the shares that fall far short of full disposal of these assets into 
private  ownership.  Another  aspect  of  change  in  the  engagement  of  the  state  in  the  productive 
resources  of  the  economy  is  the  growth  of  public-private  partnerships  –  where  infrastructural 
investments might once have been resourced from and controlled by the public purse, private sector 
investments  deriving  an  income  stream  over  time  became  more  common.  Shifts  in  the  public 
composition of economic activity took place in many OECD member states during the 1980s and 
1990s, impelled in part by the EU’s interest in increasing competition and extending public sector 
tenders as part of the process of completing the internal market from 1992 on, and further fuelled by 
the (frequently controversial) rapid transformation of the economies of the former communist bloc 
(Aslund 2007; Schneider and Häge 2008; Wright 1994). But though this tailed off during the 1990s, 
privatization took off again during the 2000s, particularly in the larger European states where state 
ownership had persisted more stubbornly for longer (Schmidt 2008). 
Privatization and public-private partnerships, frequently in areas of activity that were not subject to 
market competition in any realistic sense, gave rise to a renewed need to ensure that vital areas of 
economic activity were managed in ways consistent with public interest considerations. Hence the 8 | P a g e  
 
increased scope of markets goes hand in hand with the growth in number of regulatory agencies and 
the expansion of their reach (Levi-Faur 2005).  
Along with the growing emphasis on promoting private sector ownership went a heightened regard 
for what were taken to be the dominant organizational aspects and values governing private sector 
management. Yet these also needed to be responsive to public needs, for which elected politicians 
ultimately were going to be held accountable. The objectives were to make the public sector 
lean  and  competitive  while,  at  the  same  time,  trying  to  make  public  administration  more 
responsive to citizens’ needs by offering value for money, choice flexibility and transparency 
(Groot and Budding 2008).  
This uneasy conjuncture of objectives created tensions between political responsibility for the quality 
of government, and the organizational autonomy taken to be a prerequisite for achieving efficiency 
(Aucoin  1990).  Most  western  countries  adopted  NPM  in  some  variant  or  other;  the  ideas  were 
pervasive and persuasive. But the terms in which these tensions were resolved showed considerable 
variation. The countries that were among the first movers in introducing and implementing NPM 
were Britain, New Zealand, and Canada, all of them liberal market economies. But the diffusion of 
these ideas was not confined to LMEs: the Netherlands and Denmark were also early adopters of 
these ideas. Germany was considerably more cautious, and France was a notably late adopter (Pollitt 
and  Bouckaert  2004).  The  degree  to  which  NPM  reforms  were  adopted  and  implemented  was 
therefore not directly related to the underlying political economy or to perceived functional adaptive 
requirements. Comparative studies have revealed that it owed a great deal to two factors: partisan 
politics, where governments of the right and ‘third-way’ social democratic parties were more likely 
to be sympathetic to market priorities; and the political leadership generated by government itself, 
since reform initiatives led and managed from within the civil service itself – as in France, and in 
Ireland – was notably  more limited in scope  and ambition (Binderkrantz and Christensen 2009; 
Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2010, forthcoming-b; Schwartz 2003). 
Three  facets  of  public  sector  reorganization  can  be  identified,  across  which  we  can  identify 
considerable variations in the extent of adoption of NPM-inspired reforms: 
·  Delegation.  This  transforms  the  career  profile  of  civil  servants  –  the  recruitment,  career 
progression pathways, and remuneration packages of the public sector compared with the private 
sector. 9 | P a g e  
 
·  Decentralization.  This  entails  the  organizational  differentiation  of  the  civil  service  into 
functionally specialized agencies, with the objective of ‘letting the managers manage’. 
·  Devolution  of  financial  and  other  controls.  Public  sector  managers  acquire  control  over 
decentralized  budgets,  disciplined  by  performance  targets,  with  the  objective  of  ‘making  the 
managers manage’. 
The  career  profiles  of  civil  servants  display  considerable  variation.  The  OECD  identifies  two 
dimensions  along  which  civil  servants’  careers  may  be  organized.  Appointment  and  career 
progression may be based on a relatively closed system whereby promotion is based on lifelong 
career commitment to the public service; or it may be organized around open competition to all posts 
including from outside sources. France, Japan – and Ireland – display the most strongly career-based 
structures. Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and also the Nordic countries, show the strongest 
commitment  to  open  position-based  recruitment.  The  degree  of  delegation  in  human  resource 
management to line managers is strongly correlated with the degree of position-based recruitment, as 
Figure 3 below shows. (This does not of course say anything about the how well staff are managed, 
only about the autonomy and flexibility of line managers in identifying staffing needs, recruiting, and 
managing people).  
Figure  3.  Relationship  between  type  of  recruitment  system  and  delegation  of  HRM  in  central 
government  
The delegation of managerial autonomy is frequently associated with the creation of new specialized 
agencies, and the corresponding reduction in numbers of core civil service. Britain proceeded most 
energetically with this reorganization of the core civil service, as did New Zealand (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2006).  
Associated with increased managerial autonomy, we find growing reliance on decentralized budgets 
that involve variations in remuneration packages, in the form of performance-related pay, bonuses, 
and other mechanisms designed to keep the focus on attaining the specified performance targets.  
Figure  4.  Extent  of  the  use  of  performance  assessments  in  human  resource  decisions  in  central 
government  
Figure  4  shows  that  formal  performance  assessment  plays  the  most  important  role  in  reward 
decisions in the Nordic countries and in Britain, Australia, New Zealand; least in Iceland, Belgium, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Italy, and (once again proving itself to be an outlier) in Ireland. 10 | P a g e  
 
Reforming the reforms: post-New Public Management 
There is therefore no single blueprint for identifying NPM, rather a range of measures that might be 
adopted  to  greater  or  lesser  degrees.  The  OECD  member  states  display  a  considerable  range  of 
experience with adoption of NPM ideas. Yet NPM has not proven to be the cure-all for managing the 
public  sector.  For  each  of  the  dimensions  along  which  market-inspired  change  has  been 
implemented, there are corresponding problems that have arisen which are not capable of being 
managed through market mechanisms (Hood and Peters 2004). Figure 5 summarizes the tensions that 
arise between NPM reforms and the democratic political process 
Figure 5. Tensions between NPM reform and democratic processes 
Each of the three dimensions of NPM generates a corresponding problem for democratic politics.  
·  Delegation vs accountability.  
The delegation of responsibility down a chain of authority within the public sector throws up new 
problems of who is to be held accountable when things go wrong (Morten and Jarle 2009). In the 
private sector, line managers who do not have permanent employment status can be disciplined and 
ultimately dismissed. But public sector accountability ranges into areas in which there is no private 
sector  equivalent.  The  state  may  delegate  responsibility  for  managing  prisons,  for  example.  But 
depriving citizens of their liberty cannot be done without the authority of the state itself backing it 
(Bovens 2007; Hood, James, Peters and Scott 2005). Voters are very likely to continue to want to 
hold elected politicians responsible and accountable for management of prisons, or health services, 
or major infrastructural utilities on which large numbers of people depend.  
NPM has not proven to be a panacea for generating efficiencies. The quality of service is often 
problematic.  But  more  fundamentally,  core  values  are  put  under  strain.  Are  voters  primarily 
customers and consumers of services, or are they citizens with rights and entitlements to public 
goods? This tension is not easily resolvable. During the 2000s, the pressure in many countries tended 
to push toward restoring mechanisms to ensure greater democratic accountability.  
·  Decentralization vs coordination 
The specialization of function reflected in the process of agency creation gave rise to unanticipated 
problems of policy fragmentation (Christensen, Lie and Laegreid 2007). As in the first wave of NPM 
reforms, Britain has been to the fore in the new revisionist wave, with ‘Whole of Government’ 11 | P a g e  
 
reforms and aimed at reintegrating functions that had become excessively dispersed and improving 
policy  coordination,  and  the  ‘Better  Regulation’  initiatives  aimed  at  coordinating  the  variety  of 
regulatory  activities  that  has  grown  up  (OECD  2005,  p.4).  Other  countries  undertook  similar 
initiatives: for example, the reversal of agencification in the Netherlands was deemed necessary to 
improve the policy capacity of ministerial departments.  
·  Devolution of financial autonomy vs budgetary controls 
The delegation and decentralization of managerial autonomy tended to be accompanied by financial 
decentralization and budgets that were focused on target attainment. But two unexpected problems 
emerged: quality of performance, and budgetary disciplines.  
Budgetary  sanctions  proved  in  many  cases  to  provide  a  disappointing  control  mechanism  over 
performance (van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2010, forthcoming). Paradoxical outcomes began 
to  proliferate,  especially  in  British  public  policy,  where  performance  targets  were  extensively 
adopted,  whereby  public  service  providers  performed  strongly  to  target,  but  with  poorer  than 
expected outcomes for the quality of service delivery overall. Examples of perverse initiatives began 
to gain publicity, especially in education and in healthcare delivery.  
But the principal incentive for seeking to re-establish central control over budgetary allocations was 
fiscal. Comparative studies have demonstrated that ‘centralization of budgeting procedures restrains 
public debt’ (Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen 2007, p. 338). For Eurozone member states, the 
rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact provided framework requirements for multi-annual 
budgeting, spending, deficit, debt, and repayment schedules. The penalties for breach of the ESG 
rules  have  proven  to  be  considerably  less  onerous  than  some  had  predicted,  and  less  directly 
disciplinary in their effects than, for example, those which the Bundesbank had implemented in the 
pre-Euro German economy (which also had knock-on effects for neighbouring currencies pegged to 
the  DeutchMark)  (Blavoukos  and  Pagoulatos  2008;  Hallerberg  and  Bridwell  2008;  Hallerberg, 
Strauch and von Hagen 2009). Nevertheless, during the 2000s some countries in the Eurozone found 
themselves at the unpleasant receiving end of criticism from the European Central Bank for letting 
inflation run too high, for breaching fiscal deficit limits, or for exceeding target total debt levels. 
Ireland was one of these; so was Portugal, as was Greece. The single European currency meant that 
member states had no resource to monetary policy or exchange rates to control inflation or restore 
competitiveness. This placed a disproportionate burden on national-level fiscal disciplines as the 
main  plank  for  securing  the  multilateral  viability  of  the  single  currency.  In  addition,  of  course, 12 | P a g e  
 
domestic cost containment (especially wage and price levels) became very much more important as 
the  principal  mechanism  whereby  members  states  could  maintain  competitiveness,  adjust  to 
asymmetrical price shocks, and avoid open unemployment.  
But until the financial crisis of the late 2000s, countries’ capacities to enforce internal deflation were 
not  seriously  tested.  The  crisis  contributed  to  greatly  increased  public  intervention  in  western 
economies in the form of massive state supports to the banking sector.  Temporary fiscal stimulus in 
the form of increased spending and tax cuts, in Britain for example, also worsened the fiscal deficit. 
The  associated  recessionary  conditions  drove  up  unemployment  and  therefore  increased  welfare 
spending. But the impact of the crisis turned out to be very much more severe in those countries that 
had not already been managing a tight fiscal policy, or that had permitted an asset bubble to emerge, 
or that had permitted cost competitiveness to deteriorate. Spain, Greece, and Ireland were among 
those least well cushioned and therefore most severely hit. 
4. The profile of public sector reform in Ireland 
From the preceding section we can see that NPM ideas were implemented in highly variable ways 
across countries, and that Ireland is something of an outlier. It is a liberal market economy that 
shares  a  common  legal  and  institutional  inheritance  with  other  English-speaking  countries.  One 
might have expected that it would have been among the earlier and more enthusiastic adopters of 
NPM ideas. Instead, it behaves more like the more statist France and the Mediterranean countries on 
most indicators.  
In formal terms, Ireland does indeed appear to have adopted several of the tenets of NPM up to the 
2000s, and to be concerned to address some of the core issues arising from the post-NPM movement 
in the recent past. Substantively, however, these many of these features are less than persuasive. This 
is apparent when we consider in turn each of the structural features of public sector reform outlined 
above: privatization, agencification, and public sector career profile. 
·  Privatization, liberalization, and the rise of the regulatory state 
State  enterprise  was  a  major  plank  of  independent  Ireland’s  bid  for  autonomous  economic 
development between the 1920s and the 1960s, and it was a relatively late starter in the late-20
th 
century  move  to  privatize  state  companies  (Hardiman  and  Scott  2009).  But  during  the  1990s  it 
ranked as 8
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of the model of Public-Private Partnerships (Deloitte 2006; Palcic and Reeves 2004/5). This was 
accomplished  without  any  great  political  conflict:  employees  in  state  enterprises  were  also 
shareholders, and were well remunerated for the change in ownership. And yet, alongside the trend 
toward divesting the state of ownership of utilities and productive enterprises, new bodies were being 
created, so that Ireland actually has more national-level public enterprises (without even counting the 
banks that have recently been nationalized or received major state supports) than at any time in the 
past, as Figure 6 shows. 
Figure 6. Commercial state enterprises 
In the late 2000s, Ireland fell in line with the international move toward ‘better regulation’, with a 
dedicated website and annual forum devoted to this ‘important part of the Government's drive for 
greater  economic  competitiveness  and  modernisation  of  the  Public  Service’ 
(http://www.betterregulation.ie/eng). As Figure 7 below shows, there was a marked increase in the 
rate of creation of regulatory bodies after 1990, the great majority of which were statutory (though 
some private delegated regulatory powers also exist).  
Figure 7. The legal form of regulatory agencies in Ireland  
By the late 2000s, Ireland had the largest number of regulatory bodies of any of the states included in 
a cross-national database of regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur 2006; Scott 2008). 
·  Agencification without decentralization 
In fact, Ireland has seen a strong trend toward creation of new agencies of all sorts over time, as 
Figure 8 shows. 
Figure 8. Agencies in Ireland: new and cumulative  
The functions served by these agencies are revealing. The growth of regulatory agencies has already 
been noted; there was some increase in bodies of an advisory nature; but the strongest growth is seen 
in the area of service delivery, as Figure 9 below shows. 
Figure 9. Functions of agencies in Ireland 
Yet this was not accompanied by any corresponding decline in employment or scope of activity of 
core ministerial departments, nor of any build-up of core policy capacity to counter-balance agencies 14 | P a g e  
 
as delivery systems. Rather, as the OECD noted in a major review of the Irish public service in 2008, 
what seems to have happened is a largely ad hoc tendency to create a new agency to serve each new 
need  as  it  arises,  in  a  manner  that  enabled  policy  makers  to  circumvent  limits  on  public  sector 
recruitment and budget allocation (OECD 2008, pp.298-9). So the agencification of the Irish public 
service was driven by motives that reflected, if anything, the very opposite of efficiency-seeking 
budget-limiting rational management priorities. Ireland currently experiences similar problems of 
poor policy coordination and fragmentation of responsibilities as other countries that had been more 
consistent  adopters  of  the  NPM  agenda,  but  for  rather  different  reasons  (Hardiman  and 
MacCarthaigh 2010, forthcoming-b forthcoming). 
·  Civil service careers profiles 
We have already noted in Figure 4 that Ireland’s civil service remained largely untouched by the 
logic of NPM reward systems. Career advancement was opened out, but only within the civil service 
itself. Little or no discretion over human resource management was devolved from the centre. During 
the 2000s, sizeable pay bonuses were made available for higher civil servants, linked to performance 
assessment.  But  these  were  not  conditional  on  any  specific  performance  targets,  and  were  not 
strongly conditional. Virtually all eligible candidates received them. Furthermore, the basic pay rates 
themselves underwent rapid upscaling, as the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public 
Sector explicitly adopted private sector comparators for senior public service positions. This was in 
line with the NPM argument that senior management responsibilities in public and private sectors 
should attract comparable rewards. But in the absence of the other disciplines and demands on the 
senior  civil  service,  significantly  raising  the  pay  ceiling  significantly  raised  the  public  pay  bill 
without  necessarily  ensuring  commensurate  efficiencies.  Meanwhile,  the  numbers  employed  at 
senior levels in the civil service increased far more rapidly than in all other grades (Hardiman and 
MacCarthaigh 2010, forthcoming-a forthcoming) 
Explaining the trajectory of public sector reform in Ireland 
Ireland has had recurrent phases of interest in public sector reform: in the late 1960s, in the early 
1990s, and again in the current period (Devlin Report 1970; McKevitt 1995; OECD 2008). As we 
have noted, the institutional inheritance meant that Ireland experienced many of the same impulses to 
seek public sector reform as did other English-speaking countries with Whitehall-type bureaucracies 
and  Westminster-type  parliamentary  systems:  to  seek  greater  efficiencies  in  public  spending,  to 
promote initiative-taking by public employees, to improve the quality of services. Ireland, Canada, 15 | P a g e  
 
New Zealand, and Australia, like Britain, had relatively well-qualified public service employees, 
relatively uncorrupt public administrations, and a strong persistence of the political neutrality of the 
civil service. Yet Ireland proved very much the laggard in this group.  
The main phase of public sector reform, which began in the early 1990s under the inspiration of 
NPM  ideas  and  the  example  of  reform  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  was  initially  termed  the 
Strategic Management Initiative, and was at first an initiative on the part of a group of senior civil 
servants. Later taken under the wing of the Department of the Taoiseach, it was rebranded as the 
‘public service modernization programme’. This became an instrument for government to engage 
with EU initiatives in areas such as regulatory impact assessment, e-government, and so on. The fact 
that  it  was  a  bottom-up  initiative,  emanating  from  senior  civil  servants  themselves  rather  than 
originating in a government manifesto, is no necessary  reason for it to be ineffective.  But New 
Zealand and Canada started their public sector reforms earlier, progressed faster with them, and 
refashioned structures and practices more extensively than Ireland did. 
Comparative  analysis  suggests  that  three  principal  factors  can  be  identified  which  help  explain 
contrasting outcomes: 
·  Implementation of financial disciplines 
·  Capacity for policy coordination  
·  Government drivers 
Ultimately all three factors can be summarized under the single heading ‘the shadow of hierarchy’, 
that is, a strong commitment by government to achieve a clear and consistent set of policy objectives, 
with a strategy to which all government members are committed for achieving them. 
Financial disciplines 
Budget-setting remained highly centralized in the Irish case, including rates of pay, as noted above; 
and unlike other countries that implemented NPM, pay was not closely tied to changes in work 
practices (Roche 1998). Budget allocations were not made conditional on structural change, and the 
‘modernization agenda’ had no specific content. Remuneration rates were set by the national-level 
pay  determination  mechanisms,  dominated  by  the  national  social  partnership  framework  deals 
between 1987 and 2009 (of which more below).  
A major review of the structure of public sector pay was undertaken under the terms of the pay 
agreement entitled Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000-2002). This was intended to take 16 | P a g e  
 
care of anomalies between public and private sector pay rates, as public pay was believed at the time 
to  have  fallen  behind  the  private  sector  during  the  boom.  It  was  also  intended  to  deal 
comprehensively with the persistent tendency toward self-sustaining leapfrogging pay claims based 
on  relativity  and  differentials  within  the  public  sector  itself.  The  ensuing  Public  Service 
Benchmarking Body, which reported in June 2002, was criticized at the time for recommending 
significant pay increases for most public employees, but without making explicit what the bases for 
its  recommendations  were.  The  suspicion  was  that  it  was  primarily  a  means  of  settling  pay 
grievances in the public sector, rather than a mechanism for calibrating public and private sector pay. 
Pay awards in the public sector continued on an upward trend during the 2000s. By the late 2000s, 
evidence was accumulating that public sector pay rates were not outstripping the private sector. Yet 
there was no mechanism for downward revision of relative costs (Boyle 2008; FitzGerald 2002; 
Kelly, McGuinness and O'Connell 2009). 
Benchmarking, in addition to the subsequent pay deals for all that were negotiated in 2003 and 2006, 
was meant to provide for ongoing flexibility in work practices without further financial recompense. 
This was explicitly built into the agreement titled Toward 2016 (2006). However, the details of what, 
how, and on what terms flexibility and rationalization were to be implemented were never spelled 
out for either the core civil service, or for public service workers in areas such as health, education, 
police, prison officers, and so on. This failure of public sector management to drive change contrasts 
with developments over this time in the private sector, where rationalization of work practices was 
extensive. Furthermore, while performance-based bonuses were indeed introduced for senior civil 
servants and public sector employees, these were not seriously conditional, and became an expected 
part of everyone’s remuneration package (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2010, forthcoming-b).
1 
Capacity for policy coordination 
Devolution of autonomy within the civil service and creation of autonomous functioning by public 
agencies implies a capacity to set targets about objectives and outcomes. In Ireland, control over 
policy implementation continued to flow from the top, with very little commitment to real functional 
devolution. This did little to expand the capacity of the system to cope with new challenges. As 
                                                 
1 Abolition of bonus payments was recommended by the Review Body on higher-paid public employees, in September 
2009. Yet senior civil servants argued that bonuses should be treated as part of core pay for the purpose of calculating 
pay cuts imposed in January 2010 (see below p. 28) – underscoring the fact that they were not regarded as seriously 
conditional at all. 17 | P a g e  
 
noted above, the creation of new agencies was often the response to new problems: this would enable 
new staff to be recruited, with specific objectives. Agency proliferation reflected the weakness of the 
core civil service rather than its strength. 
Furthermore,  while  staff  mobility  across  departments  and  more  open  competition  for  promotion 
within the civil service was encouraged by the modernization programme, this had a paradoxical 
outcome. In a system based on generalist principles of recruitment, where learning on the job is so 
important, promotions across departments tend to result in the dispersal rather than intensification of 
specific policy expertise. The growth of government reliance on externally sourced expertise in the 
form of consultancy reports suggests that the performance standards of the core civil service were 
lower than required. 
The  extent  of  engagement  between  the  public  service  and  what  we  might  term  civil  society 
organizations  varies  considerably.  The  social  partnership  processes  expanded  to  include  wide-
ranging consultative and policy advisory committees, and included representatives from the trade 
union  movement,  employers’  associations,  and  a  variety  of  community  and  voluntary  sector 
organizations, along with representation from the main economic and social departments of the civil 
service  itself.  These  working  groups  developed  policy  proposals  on  many  issues  arising  from 
employment relations and working conditions; as participants have noted, almost everything touches 
upon labour market concerns in some way. But these reports made relatively little impact on the 
standard working practices of the civil service departments themselves (Hardiman 2006).  
Government drivers 
The key to public sector modernization ultimately lies in the strength and coherence of government’s 
commitment to ensuring it happens. This is the key area of weakness in the Irish case. In Britain or 
New  Zealand,  where  two-party  government  competition  sharpened  policy  options,  market-
conforming priorities, once adopted, could be drive through by a strong coordinating state. In New 
Zealand, it has been noted that ideas about managerialist reforms in the public service began within 
the senior civil service itself, initiated by Chicago-school economists in the Ministry for Finance, 
during  the  1980s.  But  these  gained  no  traction  until  a  reasonably  sympathetic  government  was 
elected which took on these ideas and was prepared to implement them (Boston, Martin, Pallot and 
Walsh 1996).  
In Ireland, public sector reform ideas drew some inspiration from the New Zealand experiment. But 
the senior civil servants themselves did not go so far as to advocate disruption of some of the key 18 | P a g e  
 
elements of the Irish ‘public service bargain’ which accorded many privileges to its senior cadres. 
And with no left-right divide, ideological choices in party political debate tend to be blurred, in the 
interests of vote maximization. No Irish prime minister resembled Margaret Thatcher in Britain, or 
David Lange in New Zealand, or Brian Mulroney in Canada, who were animated by reforming zeal 
and willing to do battle with vested interests to achieve market-conforming reforms. The dominant 
policy-making style in Ireland has a bias toward consultation, toward seeking compromise, or at least 
toward brokering a deal that will avert open conflict.  
This is especially evident in labour market management. The adversarial conflict in a voluntarist 
industrial relations system had proven damaging not only to business competitiveness but also to 
trade union and employee interests during the 1960s and again during the 1980s. Social partnership 
provided a structure to manage pay determination, defuse industrial conflict, and take soundings 
about policy preferences from various organized interests (Hardiman 2006; Roche 2009). It has been 
argued that the quality of decision-making depends not only on the capacity of government and its 
public administration to consult and engage with organized interests, but also on its capacity to 
aggregate and prioritize those inputs in the light of broader public interest concerns (Evans 1995; 
Pierre and Peters 2005; Weiss 1998). But the risk is that the policy process will become colonized by 
sectional interests – not least those of senior civil servants themselves. Much depends therefore on 
the  government’s  commitment  to  setting  clear  priorities,  and  the  willingness  and  capacity  of 
individual ministers to drive these through. In the Irish case, these considerations tend not to assume 
a high priority.  
In summary therefore, the public sector modernization project in Ireland was widely supported in 
principle from the early to mid 1990s on. But its implementation was limited on all the conventional 
measures.  It  was  stronger  on  symbolic  areas  such  as  customer  service  statements  than  on  real 
substantive change. As a result, the OECD 2008 report was able to recommend a whole range of 
public sector reforms which in theory had been under way for quite some time. Government renewed 
its  commitment  to  public  sector  reform,  now  renamed  the  ‘Transforming  Public  Services’ 
Programme, with a dedicated website at www.onegov.ie.  But public sector reform now has to be 
undertaken in conditions of economic crisis. This adds considerably to the problems government 
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5. Public sector reform in economic crisis 
The scale of the fiscal problems Ireland now faces are considerable. The origins of the current crisis 
are complex: the international financial crisis brought into the open the extent of domestic fiscal 
mismanagement during the 2000s. Since the introduction of the Euro and the influx of cheap credit it 
facilitated,  which  coincided  with  the  peak  of  the  growth  boom,  management  of  Irish  domestic 
finances has been problematic. Fiscal policy has tended to be pro-cyclical, a recurrent weakness in 
the budget process (Hallerberg et al. 2007; Lane 2003; 2009). Furthermore, a property boom was 
permitted to flourish. As a result, revenue came to rely disproportionately on construction-related 
items,  even  as  the  income  tax  base  was  diminished  as  part  of  the  social  partnership  pay  deals 
(Schwartz  and  Seabrooke  2008).  The  collapse  of  the  property  bubble  resulted  in  a  collapse  in 
revenue, worsened by the sudden sharp rise in unemployment from 4% in 2007 to 12.5% in 2009.   
In addition to increased demand on welfare services, public spending on commitments entered into 
in  more  buoyant  times  continued  to  increase.  The  fiscal  gap  opened  wide,  and  the  public  debt 
projections had to be scaled up considerably, as Figures 11 and 11 below show. 
Figure 10. Government balance forecasts, % GDP  
Figure 11. Government debt forecasts, % GDP 
Ireland thus has a particularly severe fiscal deficit problem, second only to that of Greece within the 
Eurozone.  The  scale  of  Ireland’s  borrowing  requirements  means  that  the  accumulated  debt  is 
mounting rapidly also, with further implications for the cost of debt servicing. 
Managing the rate of pay-related cost increases in the economy is therefore a vital aspect of fiscal 
policy.  Ireland  evolved  a  distinctive  system  of  pay  bargaining  to  deal  with  this  –  less  strongly 
institutionalized  than  in  many  continental  European  countries  that  have  strong  labour  law,  but 
considerably more coordinated than in most other liberal market economies (Avdagic, Rhodes and 
Visser 2005). Between 1987 and December 2009, seven framework social partnership agreements 
were  negotiated,  each  of  about  three  years’  duration  (O'Donnell  2008).  Negotiated  against  the 
backdrop of a strategy report by the tripartite consultative National Economic and Social Council, 
these agreements initially forged a new understanding among labour market actors about the role of 
pay determination in macroeconomic stabilization. Then during the 1990s, they provided a vital 
support to the government policy objective of securing eligibility for membership of the Euro.  They 
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while  widening  the  tax  base,  and  for  linking  this  with  moderation  in  pay  rates.  Over  time,  the 
agreements dealt not only with pay rates and the mechanisms for dealing with disagreements or 
disputes over industrial relations issues. They also came to include many issues about labour market 
legislation, unemployment and work activation, and the social economy. The consultation processes 
of social partnership were broadened in 1996 to include a wide range of organized interest groups 
with broad social policy interests.  
The role of social partnership pay deals changed over time though, and during the boom years of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, tensions between union and employer preferences became acute. New 
deals were eventually agreed. But the macroeconomic context of high inflation and high growth, 
within a fixed exchange rate and monetary policy regime, put unprecedented pressure on the wage-
setting system. The net outcome has been a rapid rise in nominal pay rates, and a marked loss in 
international cost competitiveness, as Figure 12 below shows. 
Figure 12. EU monetary and competitiveness conditions 
This diagram also shows that the credibility of the government response to the international money 
markets is in question. The gap that emerged between German base rates and the Irish and Greek 
terms  of  borrowing  widened  dramatically  during  2008.  This  implied  a  downgrading  of 
creditworthiness by the credit rating agencies and therefore a higher price for government borrowing. 
Ireland,  like  Greece,  is  in  severe  breach  of  the  terms  of  the  EU  Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  It 
negotiated a scaled phase of fiscal recovery with the European Central Bank, and Irish performance 
is  due  to  be  back  within  ECB  parameters  by  2014.
2  This  implies  a  stringent  process  of  budget 
management  and  deficit  reduction  over  a  number  of  years,  not  just  on  a  once-off  basis.  The 
government  took  the  view  that  front-loading  spending  cuts  would  be  beneficial  in  tackling  the 
problems; but further cuts are in store over coming years too. 
The decision to seek €4bn in spending cuts, €1.4bn of which was to come from public sector pay, 
was the context within which the whole process of social partnership came unstuck in December 
2009. The existing pay agreement, entitled Toward 2016, negotiated in 2006 with rolling renewal 
dates, had been negotiated before the scale of the economic crisis had become apparent. This came 
increasingly under strain as employers’ and unions’ expectations diverged. But it was government 
that precipitated its collapse (as we shall see below). The government was not satisfied with the 
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terms the unions were prepared to agree to achieve cost savings for Budget 2010, so it proceeded to 
cut  pay  and  welfare  unilaterally.  Against  this  backdrop,  the  private  sector  employers  formally 
rescinded their participation in the pay agreement in January 2010.  
The Irish government took a series of dramatic budget measures during 2009, culminating in the 
budget in December 2009 that made severe cuts in current spending. The expectation is that this will 
break  the  perceived  link  between  Ireland  and  Greece,  and  put  some  distance  between  Ireland’s 
capacity to mange fiscal crisis and that of the other peripheral Eurozone members Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, Greece or PIGS as they have come to be termed. 
The  challenge  of  securing  a  credible  budgetary  strategy  therefore  hinges  the  capacity  of  the 
government to take tough decisions, and their ability to make them stick in the teeth of potential 
unrest,  resistance,  opposition.  This  in  turn  raises  questions  about  the  mechanisms  available  for 
securing consent through negotiation – ‘networks’ – or through unilateral imposition – ‘hierarchy’. 
Irish governments face two areas of difficulty as they seek to tackle the issue of public sector reform 
under conditions of economic crisis: 
·  Changing  the  public  service  bargain  on  pay  and  terms  of  remuneration;  also  on 
rationalization of work practices, staff redeployment, and attaining efficiencies 
·  Political legitimation of change 
The central challenge therefore is how to manage these reform imperatives within an institutional 
framework that is itself undergoing profound change.  
The challenge to the public service bargain: remuneration and rationalization 
The principal challenge to reconfiguring the public service ‘bargain’ in Ireland arises from the fact 
that the institutional context within which negotiations have taken place for over 20 years to date – 
social partnership – has now broken down under pressure of fiscal crisis. The government has made 
spending cuts the principal plank of its fiscal stabilization measures (rather than tax increases, at a 
time when the revenue base is shrinking and unemployment is rising rapidly). This is addressed in 
two ways: through seeking to reduce numbers in employment (by imposing a complete embargo on 
recruitment, and by incentivizing retirement), and by straightforward cuts to nominal pay rates and to 
social welfare payments – a strategy never before attempted.  22 | P a g e  
 
Government  commissioned  a  review  of  spending  commitments,  published  in  July  2009,  entitled 
Report  of  the  Special  Group  on  Public  Service  Numbers  and  Expenditure  Programmes.
3  (This 
quickly gained the nickname ‘An Bord Snip Nua’, or ‘The New Cuts Board’, as a similar scoping 
report had been chaired by the same individual, economist Colm McCarthy, in 1987). This report, 
based on submissions by government departments and agencies as well as the board members’ own 
analyses, made numerous recommendations, including proposing that many agencies should be shut 
down or merged back into core departments. Budget 2009 announced rationalization of 41 agencies 
– some closures, some mergers – resulting in 14 fewer bodies than before.
4  
At the same time as achieving spending cuts, government seeks to make public sector reform a top 
priority.  Indeed,  rationalization  of  work  practices  is  a  necessary  corollary  of  the  freeze  in 
recruitment, as redeployment of staff and flexibility in work responsibilities to take up the extra 
workload would be essential to maintain existing levels of activity and service delivery. But it is a 
commonplace of structural change in organizations that money is the grease that facilitates change: 
people expect financial rewards for cooperating with major changes. 
The cuts in public spending unrolled steadily between late 2008 and 2010. In October 2008, the 
government  introduced  an  emergency  budget,  which  included  plans  to  means-test  medical  card 
entitlements for 70+. Despite promise to retain entitlements to free care for 95% of over-70s, 15,000 
older people took to the streets, resulting in a partial climb-down by government. In the same budget, 
new levies, tiered by income at 1%, 2% and 3%, were imposed on all employees.  
 
In February 2009, another measure was announced, which was intended to be the main plank of the 
government’s recovery plan for the year, involving a direct income levy on all public servants. This 
was announced as a ‘pension levy’ to help fund the preferential pension rates available to the public 
sector. But it was not hypothecated to fund the pension reserve; it was a relatively simple means of 
raising an anticipated €1.4bn. It was set at a rate of 3% for those earning €15,000, rising to 9.6% for 
those earning €300,000. A fortnight later, 100,000 people marched in protest through Dublin. 2,000 
police (gárdaí) also took part in a separate protest (they are not permitted to engage in industrial 
action). 
                                                 
3 Details and links are at http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=5861.  
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A second emergency budget was announced in April 2009 which increased the levies on all incomes, 
doubling the rates announced in October 2008 to 2%, 4%, 6%. This also imposed   increases in 
charge for most potential users of hospital Accident and Emergency facilities (those who are not 
entitled to means-tested medical cards), and on in-patient daily hospital charges. 
 
The budget for 2010, announced in December 2009, imposed the most extensive spending cuts to 
date – and for the first time introduced direct cuts in nominal pay rates and social welfare transfers. 
To some extent the effects of reduced pay are offset by deflation, especially in food costs, softening 
the impact on real disposable income to some degree; and some commentators noted that social 
welfare payments had risen more rapidly in the Republic than in Britain and Northern Ireland during 
the boom years, with potentially damaging implications for labour market incentives. However, the 
cuts affected all categories of welfare recipients and were not specifically targeted at improving work 
activation.
5 The profile of public sector pay cuts introduced in December 2009 is summarized in 
Figure 13 below. 
Figure 13. Details of pay cuts in the public sector, December 2009 
Legitimation problems 
The Irish government has taken a serious of tough decisions affecting budget provisions and public 
service pay and conditions since 2008. The political challenge remains to carry them through. Two 
aspects of this may be considered: the electoral constraints, and the opposition that may arise from 
public sector employees themselves. 
Electorally, the Irish government currently has historically low levels of approval ratings. Indeed, 
across Europe, it appears that Irish people trust their government less than in any other country 
except Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Latvia, as Figure 14 below shows.  
Figure 14. Public trust in national governments in Europe, September 2009  
This  is  not  wholly  attributable  to  anger  over  the  suddenness  of  the  crisis  and  the  unpalatable 
remedies the government is proposing; it also exposes simmering dissatisfaction for other reasons 
which high growth had for a time obscured (Hardiman 2009). Yet the government is not in imminent 
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danger of collapse. The coalition partners recognize that they would suffer calamitous defeat if they 
were to call an election, and so they have made a virtue of their tough stance and deep unpopularity. 
There is a widespread view that the manner in which the budget cuts were implemented was unfair, 
especially  in  requiring  cuts  of  even  the  most  vulnerable  amongst  welfare  recipients.  A  majority 
expects even worse measures to come. To this extent, the government has succeeded in conveying 
the scale of the crisis facing the Irish economy and in creating assent to the diagnosis, if not consent 
to  the  remedies.
6  But  unlike  in  Greece,  there  has  been  no  immediate  politicization  of  budget 
decisions along left-right partisan lines. The opposition parties, while seeking to make political gains 
from the government’s unpopularity, have not sought to mobilize popular dissatisfaction through 
street protests. Nor has there been any spontaneous eruption of public disorder. The public sector 
unions  held  another  one-day  strike  and  street  protest  in  November  2009.  They  are  preparing 
industrial action in 2010. But this is more likely to take the form of non-cooperation and work-to-
rule measures than in all-out strike action. The conventional political system has been able to contain 
the deep levels of public discontent to date. But the way forward for public sector reform is unclear. 
The unilateral government reduction of public sector pay is the single most contentious issue; this is 
where the potential for conflict is greatest. Two issues have stirred up anger: the distributive impact 
of pay cuts, and the relationship between cost-cutting and reform-oriented changes in work practices. 
·  The distributive impact of pay cuts 
Two dimensions of contention about the impact of cost-based pay adjustments in the public sector 
have emerged. The first concerns the comparability between the public and private sectors. The 
second concerns the impact of cuts on high-paid and low-paid public service employees.  
The government undertook cut public sector pay to reduce the cost of the public sector. It justified 
this with reference what it now claimed was the unsustainability of the pay increases awarded over 
the preceding years, and divergences from private sector pay trends under conditions of recession. 
The unions were holding to the view that public sector nominal pay could only be adjusted upward, 
never  downward.  Real  cost  adjustments  are  managed  in  a  range  of  ways  in  the  private  sector. 
Nominal  pay  cuts  rarely  if  ever  feature.  Private  sector  employers  may  seek  flexibility  in  total 
remuneration (cutting bonuses), in time worked (short hours for reduced pay), in work flexibility 
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(redeployment  or  work  intensification  or  productivity  increases),  or  in  numbers  employed 
(unemployment). There is disagreement about what was actually going on in the private sector, but 
all these adaptations are clearly happening. Government insisted that the public sector had to follow 
suit. 
The social partnership institutions were reactivated to find a negotiated response. In talks between 
government and the trade union movement in November 2009, very close to the budget deadline, a 
package deal came close to being agreed that would deliver cost control through a whole range of 
changes to work practices spread over one year but without any cuts to basic pay.
7 At the last minute, 
government  withdrew  its  consent,  and  instead  resorted  to  the  immediate  device  of  visible  cost 
savings through pay cuts.  
Union hostility to cuts in pay rates is all the more acute because of the perceived inequities in the 
way they were implemented. Pay scales were deliberately lengthened during the 1990s and 2000s 
with a view to making the rates of remuneration of top civil servants comparable with those of 
private sector managers – although, as we have seen, without requiring the performance or financial 
responsibilities associated with managing a major enterprise. Cuts in pay rates were initially intended 
to be imposed on a tapered way on all. But intensive lobbying by senior civil servants resulted in late 
concessions to those on the highest rates of pay, ensuring generous treatment of performance-related 
elements of their pay package.
8 Moreover, retired public sector employees, whose pensions were 
pegged to the upward-adjusted scales, were not affected by the cuts at all. The pay rates of senior 
civil  and  public  employees  had  risen  sharply  over  the  previous  ten  years,  in  line  with 
recommendations of the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector: in September 
2009, this body recommended cuts of up to €45,000 per annum in the pay of Department Secretaries 
General (Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector 2009, pp. 5, 33, 37). For a great 
many public employees, sums like these represents their total annual salary.
9 But in the event, the 
cuts imposed on higher civil servants were closer to 3% than to the 12% originally projected. This 
                                                 
7 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘There Is A Better, Fairer Way’, at http://www.ictu.ie 
8 ‘Controversial reduction in top staff pay cuts, flat payments also cut for all: the actual salary cut is 3% rather than 
11.8%’. Industrial Relations News, 6 January 2010, at www.irn.ie. See also Karl Whelan, ‘No explanation for senior civil 
servant U-turn’, 24.1.2010, at www.irisheconomy.ie 
9 See for example ‘CPSU leader questions top civil servants, social partnership era’, Industrial Relations News 3, 20 
January 2010. 26 | P a g e  
 
feeds resentment by the large numbers of lower-paid public servants, who have their own separate 
union representation.
10  
The collapse of the November talks meant that reform of work practices was still not addressed. 
Among the proposals they had been considering were reforms such as: 
o  Paying overtime at flat rates rather than time-and-a-half; 
o  Introducing an 8am-8pm core day during which no overtime payments would apply; 
o  Introduction of unpaid leave, perhaps as much as 12 days per year; 
o  The possibility of staff working a small number of additional hours per week; 
o  The elimination of privilege days at Christmas and Easter.
11 
When government rejected the deal and imposed the pay cuts instead, unions expressed themselves 
doubly outraged. Their proposals to conserve pay rates was rejected; and they also claimed that 
government had thrown away the best chance it had ever had to achieve real reform to public sector 
work  practices.  This  is  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  previous  social  partnership  pay  deals  had 
committed unions to embrace ‘normal ongoing change’ in work practices as part of the package of 
pay increases. Government and civil service management had not pushed for serious far-reaching 
changes at those earlier stages, and with the collapse of social partnership, the unions were digging 
in. The ‘public service bargain’ in Ireland was now in trouble, but public service reform seemed 
further away than ever. 
As of January 2010, therefore, there is no longer any social partnership agreement in place. At the 
time of writing, it is not at all clear what the future of public sector reform – or of industrial relations 
in general – will be in Ireland outside the framework of social partnership. The public sector is 
highly unionized. Total trade union membership accounted for some 31% of the workforce in 2007 
(down from a high of 62% in the 1980s). The public sector is highly unionized though, at about 80% 
(Central Statistics Office 2008). Within the trade union movement, about half of total membership 
consists of public sector employees.  
The trade unions, for the first time in over 20 years, have no direct access to government. Some of 
the mechanisms that had evolved for averting industrial disputes no longer exist (for example, the 
                                                 
10 At first, it seemed likely that a split would emerge between the core civil service, working regular office hours, and 
public employees in areas such as health care, education, police, prison officers and so on, who were disproportionately 
affected by the cuts to allowances, bonuses, and non-standard elements of pay. But these have all now made common 
cause in their opposition to pay cuts and their hostility to their distributive impact. 
 
11 ‘Public section unions agree payroll costs must be cut next year’, Irish Times, 25 November 2009. 27 | P a g e  
 
high  level  trouble-shooting  tripartite  National  Implementation  Body).  The  voluntarist  dispute-
resolving body, the Labour Relations Commission, has indicated that it will step in to seek to resolve 
emergent disputes, rather than letting a free-for-all develop. But this is an employer-labour forum 
with no government involvement as such. It may well assume a role in disputes involving groups 
such as air traffic controllers or nurses. But neither the airport authorities nor the Health Services 
Executive has the ultimate settlement powers of an employer: that role belongs to government.  
Trade union leaders warn that government has abandoned the best opportunity ever available to 
make progress on public sector modernization; but they insist on a reversal of the pay cuts as a 
condition  for  withdrawing  their  threats  of  industrial  action  and  entering  renewed  negotiations.
12 
‘There is seething anger among the unions, that much is clear’, but it is not clear quite how far they 
may be likely to take the threat of industrial action.
13 Government ministers express positive views 
about future negotiations, but insist that tough additional cost savings have to be found in 2011 and 
that further pay cuts cannot be ruled out – indeed, that unless rationalization starts to happen, further 
cuts will be imposed anyway. The prospects for public sector reform are in the balance. 
6. Conclusion 
 Public sector reform has been a recurring concern in recent decades in Ireland as in other countries. 
We have noted that the scope and nature of reforms adopted depend on many prior conditions, not 
least the structural features of the public bureaucracy itself. More than that though, even within 
roughly comparable kinds of bureaucracy, such as those found in Westminster-type systems with a 
Whitehall-type civil service, we have seen that New Public Management was adopted to different 
degrees, and with different consequences. In Ireland, public sector reform objectives were adopted in 
principle from the early 1990s on. Pay scales were recalibrated and career profiles reorganized. But 
in  key  areas  such  as  structural  reorganization,  delegation  of  powers,  and  budgetary  autonomy, 
Ireland actually changed very little. 
We  noted  that  there  are  two  principal  explanations  for  the  appearance  of  reform  without  the 
substance. Firstly, senior public sector administrators did not provide effective leadership: they did 
                                                 
12 ‘IMPACT spells out “action” plans at national and sector levels’; and ‘Industrial threat must be stepped up, but deal 
possible – O’Connor’; Industrial Relations News 3, 20 January 2010. 
13 Carl O’Brien, ‘Searching for answers in the wake of collapsed partnership’, Irish Times, 25 January 2010. 28 | P a g e  
 
not set out measurable performance targets, or insist on ongoing work flexibility as they might have 
under  the  social  partnership  agreements.  Secondly,  government  acquiesced  in  the  appearance  of 
reform, and did not drive the process with hard budget disciplines, real decentralization of spending, 
or  related  delegation  of  management  powers.  Accountability  for  public  sector  reform  remained 
largely symbolic, and performance-related pay bonuses for senior administrators were paid routinely. 
During  the  good  times,  during  the  years  of  steady  growth  when  real  reform  might  have  been 
facilitated by a buoyant economy, the situation was permitted to drift. 
The extremity of economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 has galvanized government into taking decisive 
and very unpalatable action to rectify the public finances. The fiscal deficit requires strenuous efforts 
to cut costs, to be complemented in due course by a change in tax profile, in line with the report of 
the Commission on Taxation 2009 (Commission on Taxation Report 2009). But Ireland also has to 
undertake  an  internal  devaluation,  to  bring  the  cost  base  of  the  economy  back  into  competitive 
alignment with other Eurozone member states. This imposes very tough conditions on all employees. 
It is most transparent in the case of public sector employees, whose pay is set through political rather 
than market processes. 
Public sector reform is most easily achieved when it can be softened by financial incentives. The 
Irish  government  is  in  the  unfortunate  position  of  recognizing  that  large  opportunities  for 
rationalization of structures and reorganization of work practices are available, but it must try to 
secure these while also cutting public sector pay. Just as government has discovered the urgency of 
doing this, and has acquired the capacity for decisive action, the conditions for achieving negotiated 
outcome have worsened. It may be that adversity forces new opportunities and that the public service 
bargain may be remade on new terms. Quite what these will be remains to be seen. 29 | P a g e  
 
Figure 1. Selected indicators of economic performance by variety of capitalism 






































               
SMEs  .257  28,883  3.1  1.9  48.2  5.5  .5 
               
Austria  .266  28,872  3.7  2.0  50.1  4.0  .9 
Belgium  .250  27,716  3.6  2.0  86.3  7.3  .5 
Denmark  .236  29,328  2.7  1.7  43.8  4.8  .2 
Finland  .247  26,478  3.7  2.4  42.9  9.3  -.4 
Germany  .264  25,917  3.1  1.6  33.7  8.4  -.2 
Netherlands  .248  29,009  2.9  1.9  67.2  3.0  2.0 
Norway  .251  35,482  3.7  2.5  46.6  3.9  1.1 
Sweden  .252  27,209  2.7  1.6  47.2  5.3  -.5 
Switzerland  .307  29,940  2.1  1.0  46.4  3.2  .7 
               
LMEs  .330  29,483  2.5  2.3  40.0  5.6  1.7 
               
Australia  .311  28,068  2.5  1.9  22.9  6.4  1.5 
Canada  .302  30,303  3.2  1.5  45.9  7.3  1.4 
Ireland  .325  32,646  3.5  4.7  94.9  4.3  3.5 
New Zealand    21,783  1.4  1.3  24.6  5.3  2.0 
United Kingdom  .345  27,976  2.0  2.0  28.1  5.1  .5 
United States  .368  36,121  2.1  2.1  11.2  5.1  1.2 
               
France  .288  27,217  3.5  1.6  28.7  9.0  .6 
Italy  .333  25,568  4.0  1.8  28.4  9.4  .6 
Japan    26,954  6.0  2.3  10.5  5.1  .3 
               
 
Source: Five-year moving-wall averages calculated from OECD data. (Pontusson 2005), Table 1.1. 
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Figure 2a. Employment in general government as a percentage of the labour force (1995 and 
2005)  
 
Figure 2b. Employment in general government and public corporations as a percentage of the 
labour force (1995 and 2005) 
 
Source: OECD Government At A Glance 2009 online. 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/sites/9789264075061-en/05/01/g09-02.html  
Accessed 11.1.10 31 | P a g e  
 





Source: OECD Government At A Glance 2009. Central Government Recruitment Systems. 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/sites/9789264075061-en/06/02/g14-02.html  
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Figure 4. Extent of the use of performance assessments in human resource decisions in central 
government (2005)  
 
Source: OECD Government At A Glance, 2009. Staff performance management 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/sites/9789264075061-en/06/03/g15-01.html 33 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5. Tensions between NPM reform and democratic processes 
 
NPM Reform   Problems  
Delegation   Accountability 
Decentralization   Coordination 
Financial autonomy   Budgetary controls 
 
Source: (Aucoin 1990)34 | P a g e  
 
Figure 6. Commercial state enterprises in Ireland 




















































































































Source: (MacCarthaigh 2009)35 | P a g e  
 











Source: Mapping the Irish State database 36 | P a g e  
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Source: Mapping the Irish State database 
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Figure 10.  General government balance – budget deficits, % GDP 
 
 
2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Euro 
area  -0.6  -2  -6.4  -6.9  -6.5  -1.1 
France  -2.3  -2.7  -3.4  -8.3  -8.2  -7.7 
Germany  1.6  0.2  0  -3.4  -5  -4.6 
Ireland  3  0.3  -7.2  -12.5  -14.7  -14.7 
Italy  -3.3  -1.5  -2.7  -5.3  -5.3  -5.1 
Spain  2  1.9  -4.1  -11.2  -10.1  -9.3 
Portugal  -3.9  -2.6  -2.7  -8  -8  -8.7 
Greece  -2.9  -3.7  -7.7  -12.7  -12.2  -12.8 
UK  -2.7  -2.7  -5  -12.1  -12.9  -11.1 
USA  -2  -2.7  -6.4  -11.3  -13  -13.1 
Japan  -1.6  -2.5  -3.8  -8  -8.9  -9.1 
Estonia  -2.3  2.6  -2.7  -3  -3.2  -3 
Latvia  -0.5  -0.3  -4.1  -9  -12.3  -12.2 
Lithuania  -0.4  -1  -3.2  -9.8  -9.2  -9.7 
 
Source: (European Commission 2009) 
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Figure 11. General government debt, % GDP 
 
 
2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Euro 
area  68.3  66  69.3  78.2  84  88.2 
France  63.7  63.8  67.4  76.1  82.5  87.6 
Germany  67.6  65  65.9  73.1  76.7  79.7 
Ireland  25  25.1  44.1  65.8  82.9  96.2 
Italy  106.5  103.5  105.8  114.6  116.7  117.8 
Spain  39.6  36.1  39.7  54.3  66.3  74 
Portugal  64.7  63.6  66.3  77.4  84.6  91.1 
Greece  97.1  95.6  99.2  112.6  124.9  135.4 
UK  43.2  44.2  52  68.6  80.3  88.2 
USA  61.2  62.2  70.7  82.7  93.9  105.3 
Japan  191.3  187.7  173.1  189.8  197.6  206 
Estonia  4.5  3.8  4.6  7.4  10.9  13.2 
Latvia  10.7  9  19.5  33.2  48.6  60.4 
Lithuania  18  16.9  15.6  29.9  40.7  49.3 
 
 
Source: (European Commission 2009)40 | P a g e  
 







Source: Martin Wolf, ‘The Greek tragedy deserves a global audience’, Financial Times, 19 January 
2010.  41 | P a g e  
 


























































































































































































































Public Trust in National Governments in Europe, September 2009
 
Source: Eurobarometer 71, September 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_en.htm 
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Figure 14. Details of pay cuts in the public sector, December 2009 
Application of pay adjustments in accordance with the Financial Emergency 
Measures in the Public Interest (No. 2) Act, 2009 
 
In accordance with the Act, reductions in basic salary will be applied with effect 
from 1 January 2010 as follows: 
•  5% on the first €30,000 of salary; 
•  7.5% on the next €40,000 of salary; 
•  10% on the next €55,000 of salary. 
These produce overall reductions in salaries ranging from 5% to 8% in the case of 
salaries up to €125,000. 
 
In the case of salaries of more than €125,000 p.a, the following reductions 
should be applied: 
•  Salaries of less than €165,000: 8% reduction on all salary; 
•  Salaries of €165,000 or more, but less than €200,000: 12% reduction on all salary; 
•  Salaries of €200,000 or more: 15% reduction on all salary. 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/circulars/circular2009/circ282009.pdf 
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